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American Corn in Russia:
Lessons of the People-to-People
Diplomacy and Capitalism
Victoria I. Zhuravleva
This paper is devoted to the “corn diplomacy” in the context of Russian-American relations 
from the end of the 19th century to the Cold war period. The author focuses her attention 
on three cases dealt with the American attempts to export their corn and secrets of corn 
production to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Thеsе thematic priorities give her 
the brilliant opportunity to analyze two dimensions of American messianic feelings deter-
mined the stable long-term perception trends of Russia in the American society. The eco-
nomic one arose from the attractive prospects of exports of goods, capital, and technologies 
into Russian markets (Russia was supposed to learn “the lessons of American capitalism”). 
The humanitarian one turned a famished and backward Russia into the object of aid from 
the rich and prosperous America and the Americans—into “international philanthropists”. 
At the same time one of the main author’s conclusions is that the “corn diplomacy” played 
an important role in promoting better understanding between Russian and Americans be-
came the equivalent of the people-to-people diplomacy. 
Key words: Russian/Soviet-American relations; “corn diplomacy”, people-to-people di-
plomacy, images of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union in the United States 
In August 2009, the State of Iowa commemorated the 50th anniversary of 
Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev’s visit to the farm of Roswell Garst, the very man 
who had offered to teach the Soviet leader how to cultivate hybrid corn varieties 
that would boost livestock production and provide a plentiful supply of meat for 
the Soviet people. In those days, the Soviet periodicals were full of effusive ar-
ticles describing Garst’s innovative method, and whole books were written about 
his corn-based farming. The man himself was a welcome guest in Kremlin, as he 
gladly gave lessons in capitalist agricultural production and acted as a people’s 
diplomat in the middle of the Cold War.
Yet the story of how American corn science “conquered” Russia had begun 
long before Khrushchev’s visit to Iowa. Its first episode came in 1892, with the 
upsurge of a US movement to help the starving Russian peasants. In retrospect, 
the American eagerness to feed Russia with American corn was a strategy that 
allowed, on the one hand, to propagate the new method of people-to-people diplo-
macy that had contributed to a better understanding between the two nations, and 
on the other hand, to bolster the image of America as the land of plenty that was 
eager to feed the whole world and of Russians as students that had to be taught the 
secrets of American success. 
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The relief movement provided new impulses for the American messianic 
feelings that emerged at the turn of the 20th century, were correlated with the 
prospects of Russian modernization, and have not lost their importance until our 
days. These messianic moods had four dimensions that originated from the socio-
cultural characteristics of the American society itself and also from the agenda of 
its own development. The first dimension was a political one and consisted in the 
opposition to the Russian political regime and in the sense of responsibility for 
the process of its formation in the context of the US global democratization mis-
sion; thus, the Americans appeared in the role of “political mentors.” The second 
one arose from the attractive prospects of economic expansion, exports of goods, 
capital, and technologies into Russian markets, and participation in the modern-
ization of Russian economy; Russia was supposed to learn “the lessons of Ameri-
can capitalism.” Religion provided the third dimension: the goal of replacing the 
Orthodox faith with a rational one and the projection of the Manichean worldview 
on the positioning of the Russian image allowed the Americans to present them-
selves as “the bearers of true faith.” Finally, the humanitarian dimension turned 
a famished and poverty-stricken Russia into the object of aid from the rich and 
prosperous America and the Americans—into “international philanthropists.
A story about the Nebraska and Iowa farmers who shared their corn with the 
Russian peasants
The American relief movement that surged during the 1891-1892 Russian 
Famine holds a special place in the history of Russian-American relations. It was 
the first example of people-to-people diplomacy in action, since the famine aid 
came from grassroots groups and individual States. It was also the first inter-
national humanitarian action of such scale both for the American National Red 
Cross (ANRC) and for the United States in general. The relief movement mixed 
and superimposed the old and the new images of the Russian Empire, emphasized 
its backwardness and helped Americans to become more familiar with the Rus-
sian national character.  
This humanitarian action was in part responsible for the connection that began 
to emerge in the US social consciousness between the idea of searching for “free 
markets” and the sense of the American national mission to liberate the world.1 
Idealism and pragmatism intertwined in the motivations of the relief movement 
participants, who were moved both by profit-seeking and altruism. Such a mixed 
motivation was typical for the American nation in general. The great American 
writer Herman Melville embodied this idea in chapter 36 of The White Jacket: 
“And let us always remember that with ourselves, almost for the first time in the 
history of earth, national selfishness is unbounded philanthropy; for we cannot do 
a good to America but we give alms to the world.”
1 For instance, William Williams, a well-known American historian, insisted that the 
participants of the philanthropic movement were moved by a double motive: the opening 
of new markets and the promotion of liberty. See Williams W.A. The Roots of the Modern 
American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Mar-
ketplace Society. N.Y.: Random House, 1959. P. 293-294, 342-343.
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The famine relief campaign for the benefit of Russian peasants took shape 
in early December 1891, after the Russian Charge d’Affairs Alexander Greger 
told William Edgar, the editor of the weekly trade journal “Northwestern Miller”, 
that a cargo of corn flour was a form of aid that would be both timely and well-
received by the Tsar’s government that was willing to pay for the transport of food 
donations from the US interior regions to New York City and from there—to the 
shores of the Russian Empire.2
Edgar became the head of the first Russian Famine Relief Committee that 
was created in Minnesota in December 1891, after the state governor had made 
an appeal, reminding Americans about Russia’s contribution to the Union cause 
during the American Civil War of 1861-1865. John M. Thayer, the governor of 
the “corn” state of Nebraska soon followed Edgar’s example. After the Governor 
had made his appeal, the Nebraska State Journal published an article whose au-
thor argued that relieving famine in Russia would “call the attention of the world 
to the corn products of the United States” and “open the way for the introduction 
of American corn…to the people of Europe”.3 Following Merriam’s and Edgar’s 
suggestion, the Russian Famine Relief Committee of Nebraska, headed by L.P. 
Ludden, started to collaborate closely with the Russian Famine Relief Committee 
of Minnesota in the task of collecting and sending food aid.4
In December 1891, another “corn state”—Iowa—emerged as the second im-
portant center of this philanthropic campaign. After an appeal issued by the Iowa 
governor Horace Boies, Benjamin Franklin Tillinghast, the editor of “The Dav-
enport Democrat” and Alice French—a writer well known by her pen name of 
Octave Thanet—had created the Iowa Russian Famine Relief Commission that 
came to collaborate actively with the ANRC in sending whole corn and cornmeal 
to the famished Russian peasants.5 After she had received assurances from James 
G. Blaine, the US Secretary of State, and Alexander Greger that the Russian gov-
ernment was ready to receive famine aid from the American people, Clara Barton, 
the president of the ANRC, also became an active member of the movement and 
her organization became an important center for money donations.6
2 Correspondence between William Edgar and Alexander Greger can be found in: 
Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii (AVPRI). F. Posol’stva v Vashingtone. Op. 
512/1. D. 737. L. 201-203, 222-223, 225-229.
3 Governor Thayer’s Appeal // The Nebraska State Journal, December 20, 1891. P. 8.
4 Letter from W. Edgar to J.M. Thayer, 23 December 1891; letter from W.P. Merriam 
to J.M. Thayer, 26 December 1891. // State Archives of Nebraska. Nebraska State Histori-
cal Society. RG.1. State Governor. 14. Series 1. Box 8; letter from J.M. Thayer to A.E. 
Greger, 26 December 1891; letter from J.M. Thayer to W.P. Merriam, 28 December 1891. 
// Ibid., Box 11. Letter press book. Vol. 1891–1892. P. 89, 95. 
5 The Davenport Democrat. Nov. 23, 1891; Tillinghast B.F. A Far-Reaching Charity 
I // Midland Monthly. 1894. April. Vol. 1. N 4. P. 330-331.
6 AVPRI. F. Posol’stva v Vashingtone. Op. 512/1. D. 56. L. 73-74 ob.; D. 737. L. 2, 
124, 126, 130-131ob.; letter from C. Barton to J.G. Blaine, 14 December 1891. // Library 
of Congress (LC). Manuscript Division (MD). Clara Barton Papers. R. 83; letter from C. 
Barton to A.E. Greger, 1 January 1892 // Ibid., R. 26.
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From the very beginning, organizers and participants of this philanthropic 
campaign confronted staunch opposition and harsh criticisms from the mem-
bers of the first American “crusade” for the cause of Russian freedom, initiated 
by the liberal journalist George Kennan, after he had returned from a journey 
through Siberia. This “crusade” was supported by Russian political emigrants and 
also by progressive public and religious figures within the American society. In 
1891, these communities joined their forces and formed the Society of American 
Friends of Russian Freedom that began to promote its vision on the pages of “Free 
Russia”. Just as the Russian famine relief efforts were beginning to take shape, the 
Friends of Russian Freedom were mobilizing the American public opinion against 
the ratification of the Russian-American Extradition Treaty that the US and the 
Russian governments had signed in 1887 and that, if ratified by the US Congress, 
would oblige the US to hand over to the Russian authorities all individuals alleg-
edly involved in regicide. This anti-extradition campaign had put the finishing 
touches on the “demonic” image of the official Russia as a prison for political and 
religious dissidents.7 
Although newspapers and journals published numerous articles on the sub-
ject of “the Russian famine”, William Edgar remarked that “the general tone of 
the press throughout the country . . . was scarcely encouraging, as it varied from 
mere tolerance of the idea [that America should help to alleviate it] to severe 
criticism”.8 The consensus in the American press was that it was senseless and 
unbecoming for Americans to be helping a government that sent its most energetic 
and enlightened subjects to Siberia, treated the Jews so harshly that they were 
forced to emigrate to the US, continued to rob its peasants, and whose actions had 
not only failed to alleviate the famine but instead led to bribery and speculation. 
The opponents of the famine relief campaign appealed to ideological consider-
ations, arguing that it was morally wrong for a free and democratic republic to be 
helping a despotic and arbitrary empire. Meanwhile, the advocates of famine re-
lief argued, following Edgar’s lead, that the question was not a political, but a hu-
manitarian one. “The Northwestern Miller” and “Free Russia” became the main 
poles of this polemic whose origins remounted to drastically different positioning 
and images of Russia that existed in American representations.9
The House of Representatives of the US Congress became another arena of 
confrontation for the radically different approaches to the question of famine re-
7 On the first American “crusade” for the advancement of democracy in Russia in 
general and about the campaign against the ratification of the Russian-American Extradi-
tion Treaty in particular, see Zhuravleva V.I. Understanding Russia in the USA: Images 
and Myths. 1881-1914. Moscow: RGGU, 2012. P. 149-209; Foglesong D.S. The American 
Mission and the «Evil Empire». The Crusade for a «Free Russia» since 1881. N.Y.: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007. P. 16-27.
8 Edgar W. C. The Russian Famine of 1891 and 1892: Some Particulars of the Relief 
Sent to the Destitute Peasants by the Millers of America in the Steamship Missouri. Min-
neapolis: Millers and Manufacturers Insurance, 1893. P. 9.
9 See, for example, Free Russia. 1891. September. P. 6-7; October. P. 7, November. P. 
3-4, December. P. 5; 1892. January. P. 4-5; March. P. 8, April. P. 4; May. P. 10; The North-
western Miller. February 19, 1892. Vol. 33. N 8. P. 265.
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lief for Russian peasants. The organizers of the philanthropic campaign argued 
that it had to be an American undertaking from the beginning to the end and asked 
for public funds to ship the food donations across the Atlantic. After much debate, 
the Congress had not authorized the appropriation of 100 thousand dollars by 
the Department of the Navy for the freightage of a ship. Due to the opposition of 
Democrats and Populists, the question of whether the US Federal Government 
would participate in the famine relief effort got postponed indefinitely.10
Yet, neither the press critics, nor the opposition in the House of Representa-
tives could stall the momentum of the campaign. Its participants were driven by 
the ideals of humanism and compassion, but they also made references to the 
traditionally friendly relations between the two countries and to the image of Rus-
sia as a country that had always come to America’s aid at critical moments of its 
history, be it during the War of Independence or the Civil War of 1861-65. They 
felt that it was inappropriate and humiliating to ask the Russian government for 
money to transport the food aid. Faced with a recalcitrant Congress, they decided 
to launch a large-scale public fundraising campaign in order to finance the freight-
ing of the ships. Thus the relief campaign became a true effort of one people to 
help another. 
The Russian Famine Relief Committee of the United States began its work in 
January 1892 and became the coordination center for the entire campaign, while 
working in close collaboration with the ANRC. It was directed by John W. Hoyt, 
an ex-governor of the Wyoming Territory and former editor of the “Wisconsin 
Farmer and Northwestern Cultivator” journal. Hoyt was a man of ample inter-
national experience, who had traveled far and wide and had visited the Russian 
Empire.
Farmers and millers in Minnesota, Iowa, and Nebraska sprang into action, 
hoping to put together a ship-load of corn and wheat flour for Russia in the short-
est possible time. However, their efforts were delayed by the vastness of the 
North-Western states, the weather conditions, and the transport difficulties. The 
Eastern states were able to act faster, and Pennsylvania soon emerged as a true 
leader of the famine relief movement and opened the third Russian Famine Relief 
center—after Minnesota and Iowa.
In early February 1892, Mayor Edwin S. Stuart spearheaded the creation 
of the Famine Relief Association of the City of Philadelphia. One of its mem-
bers, Rudolf Blankenburg, a Quaker, a well-known reformer, and himself a fu-
ture Philadelphia mayor, put together and published a special pamphlet with a 
characteristic title: “Shall Russian Peasants Die of Starvation? A Question for 
Prosperous America.”11 In three weeks, the Association had managed to collect 
nearly $ 100.000 in cash and to purchase over 2.000 tons of meal products in vari-
ous locations throughout the country. These were shipped free of charge by fast 
freight schedule over several railroad lines that converged on Philadelphia. The 
10 Congressional Record. 52-nd Congress. 1-st Session. Vol. 23. Pt. 1. P.110-111, 157-
177.
11 Saul N.E. Concord and Conflict. The United States and Russia, 1867–1914. Law-
rence: University Press of Kansas, 1996. P. 345. 
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International Navigation Company had donated the use of its steamship “Indi-
ana”, assuming all costs of the voyage; the Sterling Coal Company had filled her 
bankers with sufficient coal for the entire outward trip, free of charge, the grocers 
and provision dealers had donated food for the entire crew that had volunteered 
their services.
On February 22nd, 1892, on George Washington’s birthday, the steamship 
“Indiana” departed from Philadelphia for its destination—the Russian port of 
Libava, amid the cheers of 50 thousand enthusiastic spectators. Church ministers 
of various denominations presided over a farewell ceremony that left a lasting 
impression on everyone in attendance. Two months later, on the 23rd of April, 
the Philadelphia Association sent another steamship, “Conemaug” that carried 
2.652.73 tons of flour and other stores. The use of this steamer was donated by the 
International Company under the same conditions that were used for “Indiana”.12 
During these months, the press of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Wash-
ington finally began to turn around and to support the philanthropic campaign, 
thereby helping to popularize it further.13
In early March of 1892, the State Committees of Minnesota and Nebraska 
had successfully accomplished their mission and got the steamship “Missouri” 
ready for its journey to Russia. Nebraska alone had contributed 1.350.000 pounds 
of corn to this effort. On 17 February 1892, this bounty was sent out of Lincoln 
and Omaha in two trains that were fittingly decorated for the occasion and covered 
with banners that read: “Nebraska can feed the world—1891 menu, 165.000,000 
bushels of corn”, “Nebraska is the home of King Corn”, “Nebraska to Russia—
Live and help live”, “King Corn of Nebraska—His credentials to the czar of the 
Russian”, “Prosperous Nebraska extends greeting and sympathy to the famine 
stricken Russians”, “Patriotic Nebraska with gratitude for Russia’s sympathy for 
the Union in the dark days of war”. Each sack of corn contained a booklet of 
simple cornmeal recipes translated into Russian.14 Forethoughtful American do-
nors were conscious of the fact that Russians were unfamiliar with this cereal that 
could provoke indigestion, if badly cooked.
All in all, “Missouri” carried 5.900.000 pounds of flour and corn meal. The 
deadline for the collection was February 12th, since the freight sent after that date 
12 AVPRI. F. Posol’stva v Vashingtone. Op. 512/1. D. 55. L. 30; D. 737. L. 85-87, 98, 
106 ob., 116, 124-125; Harper’s Weekly. March 5, 1892. P. 223; Reeves F.B. Russia Then 
and Now. 1892–1917. N.Y. N.Y., L.: Putman’s, 1917. P. 3-5, 7-8; Blankenburg R. Phila-
delphia and the Russian Famine of 1891 and 1892. Letters from Russia to the Philadelphia 
“Ledger”, “Times” and “Inquirer”. Philadelphia: Russian Famine Relief Committee, 1892. 
P. 58–59; The Philadelphia Public Ledger. April 25, 1892.
13 See for example: The New York Tribune. February 6, 13, 1892; The New York 
Herald. March 6, 8, 1892; The New York Times. February 5, 18, 1892; The New York 
World. May 3, 1892; The Philadelphia Public Ledger. February 1, 1892; The Washington 
Star. March 12, 1892; The Washington Post. February 1, 1892; The Chicago Times. April 
2, 1892; The Chicago Daily Tribune. February 15, 1892. 
14 The Nebraska State Journal. February 16, 1892. P. 2; February 17. P. 7; Ludden L. 
P. Report of the Work in Nebraska for the Russian Famine Sufferers to the Governor of the 
State. Lincoln, 1892. P. 5-6.
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would not make it to New York on time for “Missouri’s” departure. By then, 
4.753.516 pounds of corn had been sent. The rest of the load was bought with 
the money donated by the committee of the New York Chamber of Commerce.15 
The steamship belonged to “The Atlantic Transportation Line” that had agreed 
not to charge freight for the journey. Railroad companies likewise let the do-
nated goods pass without charge, while the telegraph companies transmitted hun-
dreds of campaign-related messages to all corners of the country. The total price 
of this cargo, including expenditures for transportations, telegraph communica-
tion, warehousing, loading, marine insurance, fuel, and crew work during trip was 
about $ 200,000.16  
On March 15th, “Missouri” departed from New York to Libava, and on this 
occasion the city’s periodicals were very generous in their comments.17 Accord-
ing to Edgar’s records, donations for this ship had come from inhabitants of all 
socio-economic levels, from 450 cities and towns located in 25 different states.18 
Edgar interpreted these statistics as a demonstration of high humanism that was so 
characteristic for the American people. In his view, American farmers and millers 
have shown to the whole world their readiness to feed the hungry without ex-
pecting anything in return from those who were not only far removed from them 
geographically, but also far behind them in their level of economic development.19
Iowa’s inhabitants and the American Red Cross were also successful in their 
joint effort. When it became evident that the federal aid was not forthcoming, 
Clara Barton doubled her fundraising efforts, and Iowa became part of the nation-
wide campaign coordinated by the American Red Cross that was unprecedented 
in its scale and international reach. In fact, at the state level, the Iowa famine 
relief campaign was one of the most vigorous. Thanks to the initiative and energy 
of Alice French, the Iowa women became an integral part of the effort. The in-
ternational character of the campaign had provided these American women that 
already had experience in charity work with new opportunities for socialization.
Governor Boies, in consultation with Clara Barton, appointed 12 women to 
the Iowa Woman’s Auxiliary to the Red Cross. These women activists had visited 
every farm and every household of the state, using house-to-house canvassing—a 
tactic that was traditionally associated with electoral campaigns. Donations were 
also solicited at schools, churches, charity concerts and theater shows; Iowa State 
University offered public charity lectures.20 The Iowa press was unanimous in its 
support for the campaign and published fundraising appeals and the names of no-
15 Northwestern Miller. Feb. 19, 26, 1892. Vol. 33. N 8, 9. P. 266, 302.
16 AVPRI. F. Posol’stva v Vashingtone Op. 512/1. D. 55. L. 30; D. 56. L. 91-93; 
Northwestern Miller. February 12 and March 18, 1892. Vol. 33. N 7, 12. P. 228, 440 a.
17 For quotes from New York newspapers, see Northwestern Miller. March 25, 1892. 
P. 451-452.
18 Northwestern Miller. Feb. 26, 1892. Vol. 33. N 9. P. 301-302, 311.
19 Edgar W. C. Op. cit. P. 13. 
20 Barton C. The Red Cross in Peace and War. N.Y.: American Historical Press, 1910. 
P. 177; Tillinghast B. F. The Women’s Gift to Russia // Harper’s Weekly. April 23, 1892. P. 
402; Report from A. French to Governor Boies, 23 May 1892. // State Archives of Iowa. 
State Historical Society of Iowa. RG. 043. Governors’ Records. G. VIII. Box 37. 
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table donors. In the Iowan countryside, the size of the corn donations varied from 
1 measure to an entire railcar. The overall value of donations in money and kind 
reached 40 thousand dollars.
Meanwhile, Benjamin Tillinghast wrote an inquiry to Charles Emory Smith, 
the United States Minister to Russia, and received the following enthusiastic re-
ply: “This movement is timely and altogether characteristic of the liberal and big-
hearted people of Iowa. The 100.000 bushels of Iowa corn, which they proposed 
to send in the form of meal, will, I assure you, be most welcome. American corn 
meal has been quite unknown in Russia but since the present famine began some 
small quantities have been brought in and made into bread under American direc-
tions. I am informed that wherever it has been tried the peasants like it better that 
their ordinary rye bread”.21
Smith was basing his reply on the experiences of Colonel Charles Murphy, 
a former Wisconsin farmer. In late 1891, Colonel Murphy went to Berlin on a 
commission from the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Jeremiah Rusk. His task was 
to convince the German Army leadership that the American cornmeal was an ex-
cellent base for army provisions. When he got the news about the Russian fam-
ine, Murphy seized the new opportunity and, after sending cornbread samples to 
Saint-Petersburg through Charles Emory Smith, came there in person in order to 
meet with Russian public officials, including the Interior Minister I. N. Durnovo.22 
Thus, in the early days of the philanthropic campaign, Murphy joined the ranks of 
those who advocated sending American corn to the famine-stricken regions, even 
though there was yet no consensus about the merits of this strategy. 
By soliciting free services from the railroad, telegraph and insurance compa-
nies, Tillinghast ensured that the collected foodstuffs would be sent to the ANRC 
warehouses in New York without delay.23 In a letter to Clara Barton, he made 
the following evaluation of what he was observing: “For 21 years I have been 
connected with the press and have been interested in many movements. I have 
never seen one where lukewarmness was so widespread… From the first this re-
lief movement has interested me deeply because it was outside of politics and 
creed”.24 
In the District of Columbia, Clara Barton had managed to collect 20 thousand 
dollars—such was the response of the Nation’s capital to the special appeal of the 
local ANRC chapter.25 Of this sum, $12,651.62 was spent on the charter of the 
21 Charles E. Smith to Benjamin F. Tillinghast, January 15, 1892. // AVPRI. F. 
Posol’stvo v Vashingtone. Op. 512/1, D. 737, L. 122. 
22 Saul N.E. Concord and Conflict. P. 352–353. 
23 AVPRI. F. Posol’stva v Vashingtone. Op. 512/1. D. 56. L. 89-89 ob., 119, 217; D. 
737. L.17, 108; Tillinghast B.F. Final Report of the Russian Famine Relief Commission to 
the Governor of the State of Iowa, June 1, 1892 г.  // State Historical Society of Iowa. State 
Historical Society of Iowa. RG. 043. Governors’ Records. G. VIII. Box 37. P. 4-7.
24 B.F. Tillinghast to C. Barton, 31 January 1892. // LC. MD. Clara Barton Papers. R. 
83.
25 District of Columbia Auxiliary Red Cross Association. To the Citizens and Resi-
dents of the National Capital. February 22, 1891 // NARS. RG 200. Gift Collection. 
RANRS. 1881–1916. Box 59. 
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steamship “Tynehead” that was loaded with “95.656 bushels of corn in bulk, 402 
sacks [corn]meal, 731 sacks flour, 10 bags wheat, 9 bags rye and hospital stores.” 
On May 2nd of 1892, “Tynehead” left the New York harbor for Riga, decorated 
with flags and streamers and loaded with goods that the American women had 
collected for Russian peasants in spite of bad weather and roads, lukewarm sup-
port for the campaign from some, and open opposition from others. The overall 
contribution from Iowa was worth about $100,000.26 Soon after this event, Till-
inghast “asked Edgar what he thought would be the effect of sending four ship 
loads of American bread stuffs to Russia. [Edgar’s] answer was that it would do 
more to cement friendly relations between Russia and this country than 50 years 
of diplomacy.”27
The fifth and the last steamship of the Russian “Famine Fleet” was outfitted 
thanks to the activity of the “Christian Herald” magazine, edited by Thomas de 
Witt Talmage, a Presbyterian pastor from Brooklyn and his friend Louis Klopsch 
who had a gift for both journalism and business. In March 1892, after Talmage 
gave a rousing sermon at his church, “Christian Herald” announced a subscription 
to raise funds that would be spent on foodstuffs for Russian famine relief. The ap-
peal was answered by Americans of all social standings, although the campaign 
organizers emphasized that the load of this last steamship, “Leo” was paid for 
largely by low-income contributors. “Leo” was chartered for 7.5 thousand dollars 
and loaded with 2.130.800 pounds of flour, including the Red Cross contribution 
from the overflow of the “Tynehead”. If the cornmeal sent with “Conemaugh” 
is added to this account, the “Christian Herald” emerges as the organization that 
had assembled the largest relief load of all. On June 13th of 1892, “Leo” left for 
Russian shores.28
All five steamships of the “Famine Fleet” had safely reached the shores of the 
Russian Empire. The representatives of charity committees that arrived with them 
and supervised their unloading and the subsequent distribution of wheat and corn 
grain and flour informed Americans about the joy and hospitality with which they 
were met in Russia, shared their reflections about the causes of the famine, and 
also recreated the image of the Russian peasant.  
Scholars who have studied this philanthropic movement are unanimous in 
their conclusions: it has positively contributed to the development of Russian-
American relations and has actualized Russia’s image in the American public con-
sciousness as that of a country that had been historically friendly to the United 
States. However, these events acquire another important meaning if they are seen 
26 AVPRI. F. Posol’stva v Vashingtone. Op. 512/1. D. 55. L. 30, 101; D. 56. L. 30, 
89; The New York World. May 3, 1892; Tillinghast B.F. A Far-Reaching Charity. II // The 
Midland Monthly. 1894. Vol.1. N 5. May. P. 410; Borzo H.A. Chapter in Iowa-Russian 
Relations // Annals of Iowa. 1959. Vol. 34. N 8. P. 589-592.
27 B.F. Tillinghast to C. Barton, 11 June 1892 // LC. MD. Clara Barton Papers. R. 83.
28 Christian Herald. March 23, 1892. P. 177, 181. See also: Russia’s Cry Heard // Ibid. 
April 13, 1892; Moskovskie vedomosti. 8/20 June 1892. С. 2; Pepper M. Ch. Life-Work of 
Louis Klopsch. Romans of a Modern Knight of Mercy. N.Y.: The Christian Herald, 1910. 
P. 15-20; T. De Witt Talmage: His Life and Work. L.,1902. P. 199-200.
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as the first example of citizen diplomacy in the history of these bilateral rela-
tions.29 
The Russian famine of 1891-92 came at the time of America’s active integra-
tion into the world grain trade. The United States had made important gains from 
the grain export ban that existed in Russia from the fall of 1891 to the spring of 
1892, while US grain exports had significantly increased over this period.30 The 
famine relief movement had provided excellent publicity for the American agri-
cultural cornucopia and had helped the US to expand its corn markets, which now 
included Russia. And so it was that at the end of the 19th century American corn 
began to conquer the vastness of Russia, thanks to the philanthropic efforts of the 
famine relief committees in the “corn states” of Iowa and Nebraska.
“More corn for Bessarabia”: teaching American corn science in Russia
Those in the United States who commented on the famine episodes that oc-
curred in Russia in 1891-92, 1897, and 1907 invariably pointed out that Rus-
sia needed to adopt American innovative agricultural methods. Besides donating 
money, corn and wheat to alleviate hunger in Russia, Americans were also ready 
and willing to share their knowledge of how to make agriculture prosper.
In the early 20th century, the Zemstvo of Bessarabia made contact with Perry 
Holden, professor of Iowa State College of Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts, 
through the agents of the “International Harvester” in Odessa. Bessarabia was 
the leading corn-growing region of the Russian Empire,31 and its local govern-
ment officials were interested in corn selection and cultivation techniques that 
Holden taught to Iowa’s farmers. Professor Holden, who was unwilling to leave 
the United States, replied to this inquiry by recommending Louis Michael, who 
came to Russia in February 1910 and remained in charge of the “More Corn for 
Bessarabia” project until 1917.
Soon after his arrival to Bessarabia, Michael came face-to face with under-
the-table dealing of the Zemstvo’s representatives who had launched a press cam-
paign against him in the local newspapers and with the resistance from the major-
ity of Uezd agronomists, who wanted to prevent Michael’s interference in their 
field of activity and did not believe that the peasants were ready for new American 
methods. The estate owners left day-to-day decisions about their estates to their 
managers and had no desire to familiarize themselves with new agricultural meth-
ods, preferring to buy improved seed corn when they could obtain it. The peasants 
were more concerned about expanding their parcels than about increasing corn 
harvests, and saw the productivity of the land as God’s gift instead of something 
that they could actively change. Michael had to recognize that the peculiar na-
tional character of Russian peasants made them see the idea of testing their seed 
29 More details about this philanthropic movement can be found in: Saul N.E. Con-
cord and Conflict. P. 355, 361, 362-363; Zhuravleva V.I. Understanding Russia in the Unit-
ed States: Images and Myths. P. 209-258.
30 Simms J.Y. Impact of Russian Famine 1891–1892 upon the United States // Mid-
America. 1978. Oct. Vol.60. N 3. P. 179-181.
31 Corn cultivation began in Bessarabia when this region was under the Ottoman rule. 
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corn before planting as strange and outlandish: they considered it to be “a foreign 
fancy” that had no practical use. 
Yet, all this opposition had not intimidated the persistent American who had 
managed to counteract it by making allies among teachers and priests. The chief 
among them was the Bessarabian marshal of the nobility, state councillor Alex-
ander Nicolaevich Krupenskii. Thanks to his support, Michael managed to obtain 
funding from the Gubernie  Zemstvo and to create the Zemstvo Corn Selection 
Commission that was headed by Krupenskii and staffed by Germans, a Serbian 
and a Czech that Michael had invited.
Michael also began to implement his other plan—the organization of school 
corn clubs, whose members would select and cultivate corn in their school gardens 
according to the American method and convince their parents of its goodness. 
Armed with a Russian translation of Holden’s “ABC of Corn Culture”32 writ-
ten for American farmers, Michael plunged into teaching. He spent the winter of 
1910-1911 selecting children from families of different ethnic origins and social 
status and forming “40 odd Boy’s and Girl’s clubs”. True to his American values, 
Michael designed these clubs as miniature Russian imitations of the American 
“melting pot” and motivated their work by organizing an inter-club competition, 
whose winners received a monetary award for producing the biggest corn harvest. 
This model experience of rationalized corn cultivation had ensured the suc-
cess of Michael’s entire enterprise and had frustrated both the skeptical forecasts 
made by local agronomists and Zemstvo officials and the peasants’ resistance.33 
In subsequent years, Michael had not only expanded his network of school clubs, 
but also attracted to his project some local government officials, big estate own-
ers, and young peasants who had managed to significantly increase their corn 
harvests in a very short span of time. John Grout, the American Consul in Odessa, 
regularly informed the US Department of State about all these achievements.34 
Through the “More Corn for Bessarabia” program, Louis Michael promoted 
the idea that the US and Russia had similarities in their development and created 
an updated image of the Russian peasants whom he found capable of adopting 
innovative agricultural methods, in spite of living “in the land known for its fam-
ines” and of being the carriers of certain negative traits of the Russian national 
character. In Michael’s view, the activities of his Zemstvo Corn Selection Com-
mission could be compared to the agrarian reform promulgated by Piotr Arkadi-
evich Stolypin, with the only difference being that Stolypin’s reform had benefit-
ted broad groups of peasants, while his program was targeted at a select few who 
32 Holden P.G. ABC of Corn Culture. Springfield, Ohio: Simmons Publishing Co, 
1906.
33 Michael L.G. More Corn for Bessarabia: Russian Experience 1910–1917. East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press; Detroit: Distributed by Wayne State University 
Press, 1983. P. 13-16, 26-36, 46-50, 60-61, 70-71, 88-89.
34 Relevant information on this topic can be found in published consular reports: Al-
len R.V. Russia Looks at America: The View to 1917. Washington: Library of Congress, 
1988. P. 170-171.
34 Journal of Russian American Studies 1.1 (May 2017)
would form the basis for a new class of independent farmers and act as a buffer 
between the peasant mass and the state authorities.35
Louis Michael noted that the benefits of mechanization in agriculture were 
clearly understood by the Russian peasants, especially the wealthy ones, and that 
McCormick reapers and other American agricultural machinery and tools were al-
ready widely used in the fields throughout the Russian Empire. These agricultural 
tools made field labors lighter and continued to constitute the main article of US 
exports to Russia. In 1910, Russia imported its first American tractor, and a grow-
ing number of publications in Russian agricultural journals reflected a growing 
interest for the technical inventions that had a “Made in USA” legend.36
Nikita Khrushchev and Roswell Garst: «corn diplomacy» in the Cold War 
period
Forty years later, the baton in the relay-race to teach Russians about the 
American corn passed from Louis Michael to the Iowa farmer Roswell Garst, 
whose corn farm had greatly impressed the head of the Soviet government, Nikita 
Sergeevich Khrushchev during his first visit to the US (September 15-27, 1959). 
This visit occurred after the 1957 launch of the first artificial satellite by the Soviet 
Union and in the context of a growing Russian-American cultural cooperation 
that began with an agreement on cultural and scientific exchanges between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union that was signed in January 27, 1958 and came to be 
known as the Lacy-Zarubin Agreemen.37
By that time, the American pianist Van Cliburn had already won the First In-
ternational Tchaikovsky Competition in Moscow and stolen the hearts of the So-
viet people, who quickly russified his name into a tender “Vanyechka”. Igor Moi-
seyev’s USSR State Folk Dance Ensemble had already made a sensation during 
its US tour. The Soviet exhibition in New York had already acquainted Americans 
with the Soviet achievements in industry and science: from gigantic sculptures 
of Soviet steel-makers to a Sputnik model emitting the famous beep. Meanwhile, 
the Sokolniki Park in Moscow played host to the American National Exhibition 
that presented the wonders of the mass consumer culture at the service of human-
ity and had become history thanks to the Kitchen Debate between the U.S. Vice 
President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.38
On a darker side, before making his historic visit to the USA, Khrushchev 
had made his Berlin ultimatum. In November 1958, he placed his former allies in 
the anti-Hitler coalition before a stark choice: either the Western powers signed 
a German peace treaty and agreed to turn West Berlin into a demilitarized “free 
city” within six months, or the Soviets would turn control of access over to East 
35 Michael L.G. Op. cit. P. 90.
36 Allen R.V. Op. cit. P. 172–177.
37 About the meaning of this agreement see in details: Norman E. Saul, “The Program 
that Shattered the Iron Curtain: The Lacy-Zarubin (Eisenhower-Khrushchev) Agreement 
of January 1958, in William Benton Whisenhunt and Norman E. Saul, eds., New Perspec-
tives on Russian-American Relations (N.Y., L.: Routledge, 2016): 229-239.
38 Ivanian E.A. Kogda govoriat muzy. Istoriia rossiisko-amerikanskikh kul’turnykh 
sviazei. Мoscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, 2007. P. 341–366.
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Germany. According to the American scholar William Taubman, “Khrushev’s 
Berlin ultimatum was a way of getting Eisenhower to the table”.39
On September 18th of 1959, Khrushchev made a speech at the United Na-
tions General Assembly, calling countries and people of the world to a peace-
ful coexistence and announcing his famous program of complete and universal 
disarmament, which, in spite of its utopian hues, was quite positively received 
worldwide. This speech, together with the Camp David negotiations with the U.S. 
president Dwight Eisenhower, who was also subsequently invited to Moscow, 
indicated that the “thaw” in the Soviet domestic politics had also slightly melted 
the ice of the Cold War. Although Eisenhower was quite elusive in his promises, 
he generally agreed to resume the search for a diplomatic solution to the German 
question through a summit of the four powers. Taken together with the growing 
cultural exchange, these developments demonstrated that the two leaders were 
leaning towards a relative normalization of the US-Soviet relations and were try-
ing to understand the other side’s position.
Nevertheless, Khrushchev’s conduct during his first US visit was quite con-
tradictory and, at times, extremely aggressive. On the one hand, he was obviously 
proud to be the first Soviet leader who had been officially invited to the United 
States. Khrushchev had been desperately seeking Eisenhower’s invitation since 
1957 and, when it finally came, saw it as a consequence of his own “missile 
doctrine”. At the same time, although the Soviet leader never missed his chance 
to talk about the Soviet triumph in space and the advantages of socialism over 
capitalism, he was extremely ill at ease and unsure of himself. The American 
prosperity filled him with anxiety and desire to look for any excuse to find fault 
and to fight back. Khrushchev feared that Americans would be looking for ways 
to humiliate him and would not receive him with due respect.40
Oleg Grinevskii, a prominent Soviet diplomat who formed part of Khrush-
chev’s delegation, later shared his impressions: “What Khrushchev wanted to 
avoid most of all was to look like an ingenious simpleton in front of the cunning 
capitalists, who, like circus magicians, presented him with magic tricks out of a 
hat and showed him all kinds of prosperity miracles that could be found in their 
rotting world. His team of counsellors and assistants—Adzhubei, Satiukov, Ily-
ichev and others—had talked his ears off with such warnings. They insisted that 
‘the times had changed. Peter the First went to the West as a student, in his mod-
est carpenter attire. But you, Nikita Sergeevich, are going to America to teach. 
Any American general would gladly turn his coat in order to get but a glimpse of 
the Soviet space and interplanetary launching pads, with Soviet spaceships tak-
ing off towards the stars . . .’ All this nonsense was in Khrushchev’s head as he 
39 Taubman W. Khrushchev. The man and his era. N.Y., L.: W. W. Norton & Company, 
Simon & Schuster, 2003. P. 403.
40 Taubman W. Khrushchev. Pp. 396-439. See also: Zubok V.M. Neudavshaiasia im-
periia: Sovetskii Soiuz v kholodnoi voine ot Stalina do Gorbacheva. Мoscow: Rossijskaya 
politicheskaya ensiklopediya, 2011. P. 208-209
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journeyed through America, and a deep trench formed between him and the USA 
as a result.”41
Nevertheless, as Grinevskii rightly notes,42 Khrushchev’s head was also a 
battlefield between a dogmatic communist and a pragmatic peasant who, upon 
Khrushchev’s return from the United States, took it upon himself to recreate in 
the Soviet Union all the good things that he had seen in the American daily life. 
This peasant alter ego manifested itself with singular strength in Khrushchev’s 
relationship with the American farmer Roswell Garst.
Khrushchev’s interest in Garst was no accident. This farmer-millionaire, 
as the American periodicals called him, was “an American revolution in agri-
culture”. His two thousand hectares of land in Coon Rapids, Iowa had become 
the birthplace of various agricultural innovations; one of them was hybrid corn, 
which was the product of inbreeding and crossbreeding. Garst and his business 
partner Charles Thomas owned a big joint-stock company that produced hybrid 
corn seeds and formed part of the “Pioneer”—a national leader in seed production 
that, apart from hybrid corn varieties, also produced new breeds of chicken and 
pigs. Garst was also experimenting with new fertilization methods and skillfully 
used silage—a hash made out of corn cobs and other ingredients—as a feed for 
his livestock.43 
The story of Khrushchev’s acquaintance with Garst had begun four years 
earlier. In January 1955, at the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee 
Khrushchev made a speech about livestock production, in which he made numer-
ous references to the American experience as an example for the USSR to follow. 
On February 8th, a summary of his speech appeared in “The New York Times” 
and was then reprinted in “The Des Moines Register” of Iowa. Two days later, in 
an editorial that won him next year’s Pulitzer Prize, its editor Lauren Soth made a 
provocative proposal. Promising to hide none of Iowa’s “secrets,” he invited Rus-
sians to tour Iowa for “the lowdown on raising high quality cattle, hogs, sheep, 
and chickens.” In turn, Iowa farm experts could visit the Soviet Union and share 
their know-how.44 Thus the “corn” state of Iowa had once more become the agent 
of Russian-American rapprochement.
In July 1955, a Soviet delegation headed by the Deputy Minister of Agricul-
ture Vladimir Matskevich came to the USA and visited Roswell Garst at his farm, 
which was among Iowa’s most prosperous, and at “Garst&Thomas Company”—
one of the largest of its kind in Iowa. Iowa’s residents met the Soviet specialists 
with open arms, showed them everything there was to see and provided them with 
detailed explanations and a pile of manuals. Upon the delegation’s return to the 
USSR, Matskevich compiled a 400-page report that, unbeknownst to him, had 
a lot in common with what Louis Michael taught to Bessarabian peasants half a 
41  Grinevskii O.A. Tysiacha i odin den’ Nikity Sergeevicha. Мoscow: Vagrius, 1998. 
P. 57-58. 
42 Ibid., P. 98.
43 Missionary of the Food. Roswell Garst // The New York Times. September 23, 
1959.
44 The Des Moines Register. February 10, 1955 (editorial).
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century earlier. Like Michael, Matskevich paid special attention to the calibration 
and selection techniques for corn seeds and the cultivation of high-yield hybrid 
corn varieties. His main conclusion was that the American corn cultivation meth-
ods could resolve the food problem in the Soviet Union and also dramatically 
increase meat production, since the best silage for livestock could be made out of 
young corn leaves, stalks and ears. Matskevich’s report also had a special section 
that described Garst’s farm, and Khrushchev first got to know Garst through this 
document.45 
Roswell Garst was among the twelve American farmers (five of them from 
Iowa) who dared to travel to the other side of the “iron curtain” in October 1955, 
defying the trading ban that the US Department of State still had in place against 
the Soviet Union and the danger of being accused of having links with Commu-
nists. Garst visited the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow and then 
stopped in Kiev and Odessa on his way to Khrushchev’ summer residence in 
Yalta—a visit that he made on Khrushchev’s personal invitation. During his tour, 
the American entrepreneur lost no opportunity to study how the Soviets cultivated 
corn and produced hybrid seeds, noting the gap between the Soviet agricultural 
capacity and the food demands of the growing population, and demonstrated his 
readiness to teach the ABC of the American corn science: production of hybrid 
seeds, fertilization, irrigation, mechanization, and the use of agricultural chemi-
cals. 
During his interview with Garst, Khrushchev made him a proposal: “Let us 
trade. We can buy some of your hybrid corn seeds. But keep in mind that our 
country is vast—we plant millions of hectares of corn. Will you be able to sell us 
enough hybrid corn seed for such a large area? Will we be able to pay for them, 
even if you could sell us enough? Besides, we have our own hybrids of good 
quality. So, what we should do is not only trade, but also exchange expertise. We 
will give you our Soviet hybrids and their breeding lines, and you give us your 
hybrids and breeding lines in exchange.” To this Garst replied that he could not 
share his breeding lines, because they constituted a trade secret, and instead of-
fered a different deal: “Send your agronomist to my farm and let him see how we 
produce our hybrid corn seeds. Send over your livestock specialist so that he can 
see how we feed our meat cattle. Send your biochemist so that he can learn how 
we fix atmospheric nitrogen and make urea that is mixed into silage together with 
corn cobs and molasses. Send your machine operator over to my farm and let him 
work in the fields at my son’s side so that he can see for himself that corn produc-
tion can be organized in such a way that one person can work 100 hectares and six 
people—800 hectares.”46
In the end, the two men came to an agreement that Garst would sell to the 
Soviet State 5 thousand tons of different varieties of corn seed and add in some of 
45 Khrushchev S.N. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformator. Мoscow: Vremya, 2010. P. 239-
240. Brown P.N. Diplomatic Farmers: Iowans and the 1955 Agricultural Delegation to the 
Soviet Union // The Annals of Iowa. 2013. Vol 1. N 72. Winter. P. 31-62.
46 Quote from Adzhubei A. et al. Litsom k litsu s Amerikoi. Rasskaz o poezdke N.S. 
Khrushcheva v SShA. Мoscow: Politizdat, 1960. P. 338-339. 
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his pedigree seeds as a bonus on this deal. These pedigree seeds were later used to 
produce hybrids at the Odessa breeding station. Besides, the Soviet Union bought 
the technology for building a corn-cleaning and calibrating plant in the Krasnodar 
region. The enterprising Garst had his hands free to make these deals, since he had 
obtained a termless export license from the State Department before leaving for 
the USSR. Yet, although he had acted first and foremost as a businessman—the 
Soviet State had paid him in gold for his seeds, eventually his frequent trips to So-
viet Russia did attract the FBI’s attention: he was later called in for explanations 
and had to convince the FBI that he was no Communist.  
While he had personally benefitted from his agreement with Khrushchev, 
Garst had also managed to break the ice in the Soviet-American trade relations 
and became an active advocate for a peaceful collaboration with the USSR and the 
development of business ties and knowledge exchange between Americans and 
Russians. In 1958, he addressed the Soviet agricultural delegation with the fol-
lowing words: “The main reason for your success is the enormous work that you 
have done in the sphere of popular education and professional cadre preparation. 
What you need now is to make contacts that would help you adopt agricultural 
innovations and increase the production of grains, meats and other foodstuffs.”47
Garst made three more visits to the Soviet Union and met with Khrushchev 
one more time, in Sochi, in spring of 1959. On Khrushchev’s request, he had even 
gone to Kazakhstan to see the virgin lands that reminded him of the vastness of 
his native Iowa. In the Krasnodar region, Garst instructed a kolkhoz foreman who 
did not want to use fertilizers about the correct ways to grow corn. The informal 
relationship between Khrushchev and Garst had developed into a true friendship, 
notwithstanding the Cold War.48 Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev who had not for-
gotten his solid peasant upbringing came to a perfect understanding with Roswell 
Garst and dreamed of turning corn into a true queen of the Soviet fields. 
During his US journey, Khrushchev paid a two-day return visit to his Ameri-
can farmer friend (September 22-23, 1959). According to the eyewitnesses, the 
days he spent in the rich and flourishing Iowa, in the heart of the US “corn belt” 
were the most successful part of Khrushchev’s visit. Receptions given to Khrush-
chev in Washington, New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco had not come 
anywhere close to the warm and friendly welcome that he had received in Iowa, 
whose periodicals went as far as declaring September 22nd “the Day of Khrush-
chev in the Mid-West”.49 Khrushchev himself told Henry Cabot Lodge, the of-
ficial host to the Soviet leader, that “it has been the highlight of the whole trip”.50 
Khrushchev hoped that by adopting American agricultural methods the So-
viet Union would “catch up with America and surpass” its levels of food produc-
tion. In his address to Iowa’s residents, he championed peaceful coexistence and 
competition. This call could not but please them, since Khrushchev also recog-
47 Quoted from Adzhubei et al., op. cit., P. 340.
48 Khrushchev S.N. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformator. P. 244-245. 
49 Grinevskii O.A. Tysiacha i odin den’ Nikity Sergeevicha. P. 77. 
50 Weherwein A.C. Iowa Skeptical, but Enjoyed Visit // The New York Times. Septem-
ber 25, 1959.
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nized that at that moment Iowan farms were producing significantly more corn 
and meat than Kuban’ kolkhozes. Anticipating Khrushchev’s reaction to what 
he would see in Iowa, American journalists wrote that Iowa was precisely the 
place where the Soviet leader could personally appreciate the achievements of the 
American agricultural revolution and see for himself what levels of prosperity a 
capitalist society could reach.51
Khrushchev’s coming had briefly made Garst’s farm the center of attention 
not only of the entire United States, but also of the whole world. So many news-
paper men came there, that, in the words of “The New York Times” correspondent 
James Reston, “there were more photographers in the trees than birds”.52 In late 
August 1959, the State Department received 471 media accreditation request to 
cover Khrushchev’s visit.53
The testy Garst got so fed up with the press representatives that he threw 
silage and corn cobs at them and even gave one of them a kick. In the end, the 
National Guard and the Army together with the State Department officials who 
accompanied Khrushchev had to form a human chain around Garst and his high-
profile visitor, so that the latter could examine the farm without further interrup-
tions.54 Khrushchev’s son Sergei later recalled: “Garst had completely stunned my 
father with the show of his achievements. Father just kept saying: ‘That’s what we 
need to do at home’.”55
Much as the journalists had bothered Garst, the press coverage of Khrush-
chev’s visit provided excellent publicity for his prosperous farm and allowed him 
to share his agricultural expertise with the entire world. In one of the numerous 
articles that “The New York Times” published on the subject, Garst appeared as 
a missionary of the American agricultural revolution that had mobilized science 
and technology to produce such innovations as hybrid corn varieties, synthetic 
fertilizers, and pesticides. To promote these innovative agricultural methods so 
that more products could be obtained with less human labor was what Garst saw 
as his goal. This man symbolized the American prosperity and he chose the Soviet 
Union as the object of his agricultural mission, in spite of the “iron curtain” and of 
the Cold War. Khrushchev dreamt of providing the Soviet people with plenty of 
meat, and Garst had made a commitment to help him in this task. In an interview 
to “The New York Times”, he made the following statement: “Mr. Khrushchev’s 
primary interest is to find out why 12 per cent of the people of the United States 
can produce enough food for the 100 per cent and with a diet high in the meat type 
of human protein. He is interested in finding out how to produce a better diet with 
51 Weherwein A.C. Premier to Find the Iowa Doors Open // The New York Times. 
September 10, 1959.
52 Khrushchev’s Odyssey // The New York Times. September 24, 1959.
53 Lee Н. Roswell Garst: A Biography. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1984. P. 
223.
54 A photographer from “Associated Press” had captured this moment in a photo that 
was then widely reproduced in the American press.
55 Khrushchev S.N. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformator. P. 247.
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less and less people. This is what I basically intend to help him discover. This is 
what he basically wants to know”.56
During their first meeting in Crimea Garst had already excited Khrushchev’s 
imagination with his tales of how granulated fertilizers could be used to grow 
corn. Now, at his home base, he could give Khrushchev a practical demonstra-
tion of how the use of nitrogen-rich mineral fertilizer instead of the traditional 
planting of nitrogen-fixing leguminous plants between the rows of corn increased 
corn yields. Khrushchev, whose faith in corn as the most productive cereal known 
to human beings was as great as Garst’s, listened and watched with rapture. The 
trench method that Garst used for turning corn cobs and stalks into silage for live-
stock had also filled him with great enthusiasm.57 Meanwhile, Garst’s wife was on 
her own international mission, as she acquainted Khrushchev’s wife with all the 
exciting details of American provincial life.58 
The American press had given Garst his due for having skillfully dispelled a 
huge “diplomatic storm cloud”, by giving the Soviet leader a guided tour of the 
real America and a taste of true American hospitality.59 Garst’s corn calibration 
plant in the town of Coon Rapids became the site of the famous photo, in which 
the American farmer and the Soviet leader are standing side by side with corn 
ears in their hands. In fact, American periodicals had published a whole series of 
photos with Khrushchev holding a bunch of corn ears, as if they were flowers. 
Even the “Life” magazine had considered the photo of a laughing Khrushchev 
standing next to Garst with a corn ear in his hand to be worthy of its cover.60 This 
cover photo seemed to confirm Garst’s opinion that “two farmers could settle the 
problems of the world faster than diplomats”.61
Later on, Garst explained his motivation in more general terms: “I think from 
our own selfish interests, we cannot effort to have one-third of the world possess 
the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb and nothing else—to be hungry at the 
same time. This is too great a temptation”.62 Just as it happened at the end of the 
19th century, in the middle of the 20th century, American farmers were chosing 
Russia as the object of their messianic impulse, laying aside ideological and po-
litical considerations.
In his speech at an official dinner reception in Des Moines, Governor Her-
schel Loveless stressed the key role of the Corn State of Iowa in the exchange of 
agricultural expertise between the USA and the USSR that had begun four years 
earlier and had opened the door for a wider cooperation: “These [agricultural] 
56 Missionary of Food. Roswell Garst // The New York Times. September 23, 1959.
57 Khrushchev S.N. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformator. P. 242-243; Adzhubei et al., op. 
cit., P. 343-346.
58 Asbury E.E. Mme. Khrushchev will Tour Town // The New York Times. September 
23, 1959. 
59 Lee Н. Roswell Garst. P. 226.
60 Life. October 5, 1959 (cover).
61 Stevenson Reports Khrushchev Hints at Give in Negotiations. Chat Held in Iowa // 
The New York Times.  September 24, 1959.
62 Roswell Garst, 79, Khrushchev’s Farm Host in 1959 // The New York Times. No-
vember 7, 1977.
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exchanges have led to broader exchanges in cultural, educational, scientific fields 
between Americans and citizens of the Soviet Union. So, in a sense, Iowa has led 
the way to more people-to-people contacts between our two great countries”.63 In 
other words, as the local periodicals never got tired of repeating on the occasion 
of Khrushchev’s visit, Iowa’s warm and humid climate that was so good for corn 
cultivation had also managed to melt the ice of the Cold War”. The American 
national press deemed Khrushchev’s visit to be quite a success and an ice-breaker 
for Soviet American relations.64
Meanwhile, the Soviet chroniclers spared no praise and called the Soviet 
leader’s trip to the US an outright “triumph”. Upon Khrushchev’s return, his son-
in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei and a group of Soviet journalists rapidly and eagerly 
produced a propaganda book entitled “Face to face with America”. On the pages 
of this book, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee appeared before 
the Soviet and the Eastern European audiences as a peace fighter, a great speaker, 
and a skilled negotiator. The book does much to confirm the suspicions expressed 
by James Reston in his “New York Times” article that described Khrushchev’s 
visit to Iowa in all its picturesque details: “In a world-wide propaganda battle, this 
is not frivolous nonsense. It is deadly serious, for while it was inevitable that Mos-
cow would be given much raw material for propaganda in the neutral countries, it 
was not inevitable that clumsy administration should make things worse.”65
This propaganda effort went hand in hand with the onset of what became a 
veritable “corn epic”. Throughout the entire territory of the Soviet Union—from 
Kazakhstan to Taimyr—corn plantations began to displace wheat, rye, and fodder 
crops. Efforts to grow corn were not limited to the southern regions, but were also 
made in climatic zones that were completely unsuitable for corn cultivation. In the 
end, it became obvious that the fantastic grain so zealously promoted by Khrush-
chev could not replace traditional cereals. What is more, as an overreaction to this 
policy, after Brezhnev’s rise to power in 1964, even the regions where corn had 
been successfully cultivated since the times of the Russian Empire stopped plant-
ing it completely. Neither could Khrushchev achieve the main objective of his 
corn crusade: the Soviet Union did not surpass the USA in meat production. The 
taste of corn that generations of Soviet people who grew up after Khrushchev’s 
visit with Garst learned to love from their childhood was not the taste of sweet 
corn that is so well known and loved throughout the world. The Soviet “queen of 
the fields” was meant for feeding cows and pigs, because in their effort to increase 
meat production the Soviet authorities planted no other varieties. It is obvious, 
that the source of these problems did not lie in the American experience, but in the 
inability to adapt it rationally and productively to a different context.
63 Texts of Speeches made by Government Loveless, Lodge and Khrushchev at Din-
ner at Des Moines // The New York Times. September 23, 1959.
64 See, for example: Khrushchev after His U.S. Tour // The New York Times. Sep-
tember 27, 1959; Mr. K Due in Moscow Today; Trip Praised // The Los Angeles Times. 
September 28, 1959.  
65 Reston, op. cit.
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On the other hand, the six months that followed Khrushchev’s visit to the 
USA seem to have been the “warmest” time of the Cold War. The intensive nego-
tiations on the German question between Khrushchev and Eisenhower at his sum-
mer residence of Camp David had raised hopes that a détente in Soviet-American 
relations was indeed possible, even though these negotiations did not produce any 
specific agreements. Nevertheless, these hopes soon proved to be an illusion, and 
the “warming” of bilateral relations had ended soon after it began. The American 
U-2 incident had damaged Khrushchev’s relations with Eisenhower beyond repair 
and was followed by the construction of the Berlin wall, the placement of Soviet 
missiles in Cuba, and the Caribbean Crisis that had pushed the world to the brink 
of a nuclear disaster.
William Taubman, one of the most authoritative scholars of “the Khrushchev 
epoch”, thinks that “in many ways Khrushchev’s trip was a success: his very 
presence in the citadel of capitalism; the way many ordinary Americans received 
him; ‘progress’ enough on Berlin to justify the president’s endorsing the summit 
Khrushchev had so long been seeking. But the glass was also half empty. The 
progress in Berlin was more image than substance: Khrushchev’s personal fail-
ings undermined his diplomacy”.66
The opinions of those American researchers who consider Khrushchev’s visit 
to have been fruitless or a failure altogether are contested by Kyle A. Kordon, an 
American historian who bases his conclusions primarily on Khrushchev’s own 
memoirs and the writings of his son. Kordon rightly notes that in order to achieve 
the kind of mutual understanding that Khrushchev sought the two leaders first 
had to exchange information that would reveal the each side’s position and mo-
tivations. Seen in this light, “the spirit of Camp David” provided an indispens-
able base for the return to good-faith diplomatic relations between Russia and the 
United States, to the situation where one side would truly listen to the other. What 
Khrushchev was able to achieve, as he got to know Americans and their manner of 
life and thought, was precisely a better understanding of the American position.67 
Alexander Fursenko and Timothi Naftali also include in list of benefits of Khrush-
chev’s visit the fact that he made a genuine effort to put in practice in the Soviet 
Union all things good that he had seen in the United States.68
Even though Khrushchev’s visit had not brought about the much-awaited dé-
tente in Soviet American relations, his friendship with “the corn diplomat” Garst 
had not come to an end. The two men kept writing to each other. In May 1963, 
Garst came to the Soviet Union and met Khrushchev once more. First, he ne-
gotiated with the head of the Soviet State in Kremlin, in the presence of I. T. 
Volovchenko, the Minister of Agriculture, and then had dinner with Khrushchev 
66 Taubman W. Khrushchev. P. 425.
67 Kordon K.A. Khrushchev Comes to America: The Advent of Mutual Understand-
ing // Voces Novae: Chapman University Historical Review. 2009. Vol. 1. N 1. P. 147-151, 
166–169.
68 Fursenko A., Naftali T. Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American 
Adversary. New York and London: W.W. Norton & C, 2006. P. 242-245.
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at his summerhouse.69 After his demotion, Khrushchev continued to experiment 
with the hybrid corn seeds that his old friend Roswell Garst would send him from 
the United States.70 Now that he no longer had all the arable lands of the country 
at his disposal, he had to limit his experiments to a small plot of land at his sum-
merhouse.
Sergei Khrushchev assured his readers that Iowans have kept a very warm 
memory of his father’s visit. An Iowa governor had told him: “Your father has 
made our state famous . . . And our corn as well.”71 We would do well to add to 
this statement that Roswell Garst had also become a celebrity thanks to the First 
Secretary of the Soviet Union Communist Party. In 2009, Iowa celebrated the 
50th anniversary of Khrushchev’s visit with a conference entitled “Citizen Diplo-
macy in U.S.-Russia Relations”, publications in the local press, a parade of both 
antique and modern farm machinery down the Main Street and the creation of a 
museum on Garst’s farm.72
At the eve of this celebration, Garst’s granddaughter Rachel made the fol-
lowing comment to the correspondent from “Rossiyskaya Gazeta”: “The more 
we talked about this idea, the more people became interested in participating. Our 
organizing committee already includes farmers and businessmen, the Iowa State 
Historical Society, and many other people who are interested in further strength-
ening Russian-American relations. My grandfather’s house and farm have been 
added to the US National Heritage list. The purpose of our media campaign is 
to remind the people about the enormous importance of Khrushchev’s visit to 
America. . . . We are very proud of our friendship with Russian people and want to 
develop it further. We also hope that these kinds of contacts will help to maintain 
peace between our countries.”73
During this anniversary celebration, it was decided that Iowa needed a theater 
play about these long-gone days and the events that warmed Russian and Ameri-
can hearts in the harsh climate of the Cold War. The play that was appropriately 
titled “Peace through Corn” was first presented to the public on January 26th 2011. 
Its script was written by Cynthia Mercati and is based on memoirs, press ac-
counts, and letters that the two men sent to each other. It is a story of friendship 
between two very different people that, according to producer Robert Ford, had 
nothing but corn in common, yet corn made their friendship possible.74
69 Khrushchev and Iowan Renew Talk of Farms // The New York Times. May 11, 
1963. 
70 Khrushchev is Living at Dacha He Had as Premier // The New York Times. January 
9, 1965.
71 Khrushchev S.N. Nikita Khrushchev: Reformator. P. 248-249.
72 50th Anniversary of Khrushchev’s Visit to Iowa is Celebrated. International Bonds 
Developed as a Result of Friendship between Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Iowa 
Farmer Roswell Garst // Prairie Farmer. August 31, 2009 // http://farmprogress.com/story-
50th-anniversary-of-khrushchevs-visit-to-iowa-is-celebrated-9-31177 
73 Khrushchev v poliakh // Rossiyskaya gazeta. 2 April 2009 // http://www.
rg.ru/2009/04/02/hrushev.html
74 Theater of Iowa in US Stages Play about Khrushchev // http://rt.com/art-and-cul-
ture/khrushchev-garst-corn-theatre 
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As he shared his knowledge about corn cultivation, Roswell Garst was acting 
as a citizen diplomat, just as the Iowa and Nebraska farmers and Louis Michael 
did before him. Even though Khrushchev’s visit to Iowa had not led to tangible 
Soviet-American agreements and the Soviet kolkhozes had not adopted Garst’s 
methods, it was not made in vain. While it is true that Americans had once more 
acted as Russia’s teachers, sharing the secrets of their success and prosperity with 
a backward country—be its name the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, the 
history of the corn diplomacy has an important lesson to teach us. Its true im-
portance lies in that people on the two sides of the Atlantic got a chance to get to 
know and to understand each other better, which was of paramount importance 
during the Cold War.  
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